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Summary
In 2003, Congress is considering President Bush’s requests for FY2004 and
FY2003 supplemental assistance for Colombia and six regional neighbors in a
continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) launched in 2001.  ARI was
proposed as an expansion of Plan Colombia, developed by the Clinton
Administration, with more funding for social and economic development programs
for Colombia and its neighbors, who are affected by Colombia’s struggle against
guerrillas and drug traffickers.  From FY2000 through FY2003, Colombia and other
ARI recipients have received more than $3 billion in U.S. funding.
In early 2003, an FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental bill (H.Rept. 108-
76/P.L. 108-11) provided $105 million in additional assistance for the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative and related programs.  This included $34 million for the State
Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, $34
million for the Department of Defense’s Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug
Activities account, and $37.1 million in Foreign Military Financing Program funds.
The President submitted his FY2004 budget request to Congress on February
3, 2003, including $990.7 million for countries comprising the Andean Regional
Initiative, including military funding for Colombia.  Of the $990.7 million requested,
$731 million is for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $133.5 million for the Foreign
Military Financing Program, with the remainder of the overall figure in development,
economic, and health programs.
The House passed H.R. 2800, (H.Rept. 108-222) the FY2004 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Bill, on July 23, 2003.  It fully funded the President’s
request for $731 million for ACI.  The Senate Appropriations Committee reported
out S. 1426 (S.Rept.108-106) on July 17, providing $660 million for ACI, with
authority to transfer an additional $37 million from the State Department’s
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account to ACI.
In other legislative action, both the House and Senate passed the FY2003-
FY2004 Foreign Relations Authorization Act (H.R. 1950/S. 925), with provisions
relating to Colombia and drug interdiction programs in the Andean region.  The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out the FY2004 Foreign Assistance
Authorization Act (S. 1161/S.Rept.108-56) with several modifications on assistance
to Colombia and the Andean region.  Both the House and Senate have passed the
FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act, (H.R. 1588/S. 1047) providing
authorization for drug interdiction and counterdrug activities for DOD programs.
The House version increases the cap on the number of U.S. military personnel in
Colombia from 400 to 500, with certain limitations.  The House passed H.R. 2417,
the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.Rept. 108-163) authorizing continuing
counterdrug and counterterrorism activities.  The Senate Intelligence Committee
reported out S. 1025 in May 2003 with similar provisions.  This report will be
updated.
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1 This report on 2003 action draws heavily from CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional
Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and
Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino, which covers congressional action in
2002.   See also CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino, which
provides more background on the ARI and covers congressional action in 2001. 
2 “Plan Colombia” refers to the $1.3 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental
appropriations approved by the 106th Congress in the FY2001 Military Construction
Appropriations bill (H.R. 4425/P.L. 106-246) for counternarcotics and related efforts in
Colombia and neighboring countries.  There was no limitation on the fiscal year in which
the funding could be obligated or spent; see Appendix C for a chart on the obligation of this
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Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003
Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for
Colombia and Neighbors
In 2003, Congress is considering President Bush’s requests for FY2003
supplemental and FY2004 funding for Colombia and six regional neighbors in a
continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative that was launched in 2001.1  The
region has been viewed as important primarily because it  produces virtually all of
the world’s cocaine and increasing amounts of heroin. Moreover, the stability of
Colombia and the region is threatened by Colombia’s longstanding guerrilla
insurgency and rightist paramilitary groups, which are both believed to be largely
funded by “taxes” on illegal narcotics cultivation and trade.  
President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative
Past Requests and Congressional Action
FY2002 Request.  The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) was launched in
April 2001, when the Bush Administration requested $882.29 million in FY2002
economic and counternarcotics assistance, as well as an extension of trade
preferences and other measures, for Colombia and six regional neighbors (Peru,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela).  Of this amount, $731 million
was designated as International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
assistance in a line item in the budget request known as the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative (ACI).  A central element of the program was the training and equipping
of counternarcotics battalions in Colombia.
According to the Administration, the distinctive features of the program,
compared to Plan Colombia assistance approved in 2000,2 were that a larger portion
CRS-2
2 (...continued)
and other funding to Colombia in FY2000 and FY2001.  For more detail, see CRS Report
RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001).  For
the latest figures on aid to Colombia, as well as past assistance, see CRS Report RS21213,
Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2003. 
3 See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Washington File, Fact
Sheet: U.S. Policy Toward the Andean Region, and Transcript: State Department Briefing
on Andean Regional Initiative, May 17, 2001, also available at the following web site
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].
4  For more detail, see CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino.
of the assistance was directed at economic and social programs, and that more than
half of the assistance was directed at regional countries experiencing the spill-over
effects of illicit drug and insurgency activities. 
In a mid-May 2001 briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative, Administration
spokesmen set out three overarching goals for the region that could be called the
three D’s — democracy, development, and drugs.  The first goal was to promote
democracy and democratic institutions by supporting judicial reform, anti-corruption
measures, human rights improvement, and the peace process in Colombia.  The
second was to foster sustainable economic development and trade liberalization
through alternative economic development, environmental protection, and renewal
of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).   The third was to significantly reduce
the supply of illegal drugs to the United States from the source through eradication,
interdiction and other efforts.3  Under consideration by the Congress in 2001, critics
of the initiative argued that it overemphasized military and counter-drug assistance,
and provided inadequate support for human rights and the peace process in
Colombia.  Supporters argued that it continued needed assistance to Colombia, while
providing more support for regional neighbors and social and economic programs.
By the end of 2001, the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (H.R.
2506/P.L. 107-115) provided a total of $782.82 million for the ARI of which $625
million was designated for the ACI, a reduction of $106 million from the President’s
request.  It further allowed for the transfer of an additional $35 million from the State
Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account to the
ACI.4
FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Request.  On March 21, 2002, the
Administration proposed an Emergency FY2002 Supplemental for counter-terrorism
purposes that included a request for $4 million of State Department international
narcotics control (INCLE) funding for Colombia police post support, $6 million of
FMF funding for Colombia and $3 million for Ecuador for counter-terrorism
equipment and training, and $25 million for counter-kidnapping training in
Colombia.  Also included in the submission were requests to broaden the authorities
of the Defense and State Departments to utilize FY2002 and FY2003 assistance and
unexpended Plan Colombia assistance to support the Colombian government’s
“unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats
to its national security.” Congress fully funded the President’s request for Colombia,
CRS-3
5 For more detail, see CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002
Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and
Nina M. Serafino.
6  For more information, see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference Act:
Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by J. F. Hornbeck; and information on the CRS
Electronic Briefing Book on Trade at  [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra1.shtml].
7 For more detail, see CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002
Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and
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with various human rights conditions, and it granted broader authority to pursue new
activities in Colombia, but with modifications that blended the House and Senate
provisions.  The measure provided identical authority for the use of INCLE and
Department of Defense (DOD) funds, including prior year funds, to support “a
unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizations
designated as terrorist organizations” such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC, “and to
take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances,
including undertaking rescue operations.”  Legislators approved the FY2002
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775) in late July 2002, and the
President signed it into law (P.L. 107-206) on August 2, 2002.5
Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act.  In April 2001, President
Bush requested  the extension and broadening of the Andean Trade Preferences Act
(ATPA) expiring in December 2001, that would give duty free or reduced-rate
treatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.  Following
committee action in late 2001 in both houses, and extensive negotiations in mid-
2002, Congress completed action on the President’s request.  Following lengthy
debate in July 2002, the Trade Act of 2002 was signed into law (P.L. 107-210) on
August 6, 2002.  Title XXXI of the Act, entitled  the Andean Trade Promotion and
Drug Eradication Act, extended preferential tariff treatment to designated Andean
countries through December 31, 2006, and broadened coverage to include products
previously excluded.6
FY2003 Request.  On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted a FY2003
budget request of $979.8 million for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), with $731
million in counternarcotics assistance under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative
(ACI).  This request included $537 million in ARI funding for Colombia, with $439
million in ACI funding and $98 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to train
and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline in northeastern
Colombia. 
By the end of 2002, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
reported their versions of an  FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill, but this
and other appropriations bills had not been enacted.  Congress incorporated the 11
unfinished bills into an omnibus spending package, H.J.Res. 2 (for continuing
appropriations).  The House passed H.J.Res 2 on January 8, 2003, and the Senate
followed suit on  January 28, 2003.  Both chambers approved the conference report
(H.Rept. 108-10) on February 13, 2003, and the measure was signed into law (P.L.
108-7) on February 20, 2003.7
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Nina M. Serafino, which tracks the legislative activity and the provisions of this Act.
Provisions relating to the Andean Regional Initiative and Colombia included
both funding and reporting requirements.  Overall ARI funding totaled $835.5
million.  Of that amount, Congress  provided $700 million for the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative, a reduction of $31 million from the President’s request.
However, the conference agreement allowed  for the authority to transfer up to $31
million from the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement account to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.  The conference
agreement provided that up to $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds may
be transferred to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative for helicopters, training and other
assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces for security of the Cano Limón Coveñas
pipeline, a reduction of $5 million from the President’s request.  The agreement also
included a number of conditions and reporting requirements. 
! Expanded Authorities.  Following the pattern of the FY2002
supplemental, Congress provided authority for a unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking, terrorist organizations and to take
actions to protect health and human welfare.  This was done, the
Conference Report notes, in recognition that “the narcotics industry
is linked to the terrorist groups, including the paramilitary
organizations in Colombia.”  However, the Conference Report also
warned that this authority “is not a signal...for the United States to
become more deeply involved in assisting the Colombian Armed
Forces in fighting the terrorist groups, especially not at the expense
of the counternarcotics program, but to provide the means for more
effective intelligence gathering and fusion, and to provide the
flexibility to the Department of State when the distinction between
counternarcotics and counterterrorism is not clear cut.”  Expanded
authorities would end if the Secretary of State has credible evidence
that the Colombian military is not “conducting vigorous operations
to restore government authority and human rights in areas under the
effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.”  The
Report also calls for the Secretary of State to report, within 90 days
of enactment, the changes in policy, including new procedures and
operations, as a result of implementing expanded authorities.  
! Caps on Personnel.  Congress maintained the existing caps on
military personnel and civilian contractors that can be assigned to
duty in Colombia at 400 each, with exceptions for search and rescue
operations.  While this cap only applies to U.S. personnel in
Colombia “in support of Plan Colombia,” and not for example to
protection of the Cano Limón Coveñas oil pipeline, Bush
Administration officials have stated that they will stay within those
limits, except in special cases related to search-and-rescue
operations.  In February 2003, it was reported that the number of
military personnel had reached 411, with the additional personnel
being deployed to search for several American contractors who were
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being held by the FARC after their plane crashed.  According to
Defense Department officials, these numbers returned to under 400
in May 2003.
! Human Rights.  Section 564 allows for the distribution of 75% of
the funds for Colombia’s military, after which the Secretary of State
must certify that Colombian members of the armed forces alleged to
have committed human rights violations are being suspended,
prosecuted, and punished, and that the Colombian military is
severing ties with and apprehending leaders of paramilitary
organizations.  Such a certification by the Secretary would release
12.5% of assistance to the Colombian military.  The remaining
12.5% would be available after July 31, 2003, if the Secretary
certifies that the Colombian military is continuing to meet its
obligations required in the first certification and trying to gain
authority and protect human rights in areas under control of
paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.  On July 8, 2003, the
Secretary issued the first certification which released approximately
$30 million.  Congress also maintained a prohibition on the issuance
of visas to any alien who the Secretary of State determines has
willfully provided support to the FARC, ELN, or AUC, or has
participated or ordered the commission of gross violations of human
rights.
! Aerial Fumigation.  The Secretary of State is required to certify that
aerial fumigation of drug crops is occurring within a series of
guidelines for health, environment, compensation for those unjustly
sprayed, and availability of alternative development programs
“where security permits.”  Until such a report is issued, 80% of
funding for herbicides is withheld. The conference report (H.Rept.
108-10) states that Congress expects that “every reasonable
precaution will be taken in the aerial fumigation program to ensure
that the exposure to humans and the environment in Colombia meets
Environmental Protection Agency standards for comparable use in
the United States.” As of July 25, 2003, this report had not been
submitted.
! Helicopters.  Language is also maintained from previous legislation
which requires the return of any helicopters procured with ACI funds
that are used to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-defense
organizations.
! Air-Bridge Denial Program.  Following the shooting down of an
airplane in Peru on April 20, 2001, which was found not to be
associated with drug trafficking and which resulted in the deaths of
several individuals, including two American missionaries, Congress
maintained language prohibiting the resumption of U.S. support for
a Peruvian air interdiction program.  In order to resume U.S. support,
the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence must
certify to Congress, 30 days prior to any resumption of U.S.
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involvement, that the ability of the Peruvian Air Force to shoot down
aircraft will include enhanced safeguards and procedures to prevent
similar accidents.  The United States and Colombia announced the
resumption of the program in August of this year after an agreement
was reached on protocols to ensure against accidental shootdowns.
Administration Requests in 2003 
FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Aid.  On March 25, 2003,
the Bush Administration requested some $75 billion to provide funds to “cover
military operations, relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq, ongoing operations in
the global war on terrorism, enhancements to the safety of U.S. diplomats and
citizens abroad, support for U.S. allies in the war, and homeland security protection
and response measures.”  Of the total amount, the Administration requested $34
million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $34 million in Department of Defense
Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities in Colombia, and an unspecified
portion of $2.059 billion in Foreign Military Financing for 19 countries, one being
Colombia. 
FY2004 Funding Request.  On February 3, 2003, President Bush requested
$990.7 million for the Andean Regional Initiative countries in the accounts
comprising ARI funding, including military funding for Colombia.  The
Administration made its request under the title of “Andean Counterdrug Initiative”
(ACI) with no reference to Andean Regional Initiative (ARI).  ACI funding forms
part of the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
(INCLE) account while ARI has included ACI plus development aid, child survival
and health aid, and foreign military financing.   For comparative purposes, a
distinction between ACI and ARI is maintained in this report. For ACI, $731 million
is requested, to be distributed as follows in descending order:
! Colombia: $463 million, consisting of $150 million for alternative
development, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and
$313 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication programs.
The overall request also includes $110 million in FMF funding, and
$1.6 million in International Military Education and Training
(IMET) funds.
! Peru: $116 million, consisting of $50 million for alternative
development, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and
$66 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication programs. The
overall request also includes $2.5 million in FMF funding, and
$700,000 in IMET funds.
! Bolivia: $91 million, consisting of $42 million for alternative
development, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and
$49 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication programs.  The
overall request also includes $4 million in FMF funding, and
$900,000 in IMET funds.
! Ecuador: $35 million, consisting of $15 million for alternative
development, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and
$20 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication programs.  The
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overall request also includes $15 million in FMF funding, and
$650,000 in IMET funds.
! Brazil: $12 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law enforcement
programs, and $500,000 in IMET funds.
! Panama: $9 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law
enforcement programs.  The overall request also includes $2.5
million in FMF funding, and $200,000 in IMET funds.
! Venezuela: $5 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law
enforcement programs, and $700,000 in IMET funds.
FMF for Colombia is intended to “support counter-terrorism operations and
protect key infrastructure such as the oil pipeline,” according to the request.  The
funding is proposed to provide training, weapons, and night vision goggles and
communications equipment to the Army’s elite mobile brigades and the Special
Forces brigade, as well as to support the Colombian Navy and Air Force, including
the provision of interdiction boats, training and infrastructure improvements, the
purchase of two additional AC-47 gunships and a C-130 support plan that will
procure four C-130e aircraft and maintenance support.  The request also notes that
FY2004 FMF funding will continue to provide munitions, equipment, and training
for the 5th and 18th Colombian Army Brigades, tasked with protecting the Cano-
Limon Covenas oil pipeline.
Other requested assistance includes $47.8 million in Development Aid for
Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, $43.4 million in Child Survival and
Health programs for Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, and $35 million in Economic
Support funds for democratic institution building and economic growth programs in,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.  The request also includes $21
million for Migration and Refugee Assistance for the Western Hemisphere, an
unspecified portion of which will provide assistance for Internally Displaced Persons
(IDP) in Colombia.  Further, the State Department estimates that it will spend some
$45 million in Colombia from the central State Department Air Wing Account. 
In addition to International Affairs accounts, the Administration requested
$817.4 million in Department of Defense (DOD) counternarcotics funds for
worldwide programs.  The Defense Department does not provide country
breakdowns of the requested amount.  As in previous years, it requested a lump sum
for all counternarcotic programs worldwide under Sections 1004 and 1033, and under
Section 124, which provides DOD with the lead role in detection and monitoring
programs.  The Defense Department can reallocate these funds throughout the year
in accordance with changing needs.  However, if prior years provide any indication
of the FY2004 allocation for Colombia, it is worth noting that $128.5 million was
designated for Colombia in FY2000; $190.2 million in FY2001; $119.1 million in
FY2002; and $149.9 million in FY2003.
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8 Panama and Brazil are not normally considered to be part of the Andean region; Bolivia
is an Andean country but it does not share a border with Colombia.  For usage of the term
“Andean Ridge” see citations under Plan Colombia on the State Department’s  International
Information Programs web site [http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].
Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries
The Andean Regional Initiative is designed to provide assistance to seven
countries in the broadly defined Andean region8, or what the Administration has
called the Andean Ridge: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and
Venezuela. The ARI built on the Clinton Administration’s 2000 “Plan Colombia”
legislation, which sought to address the  increasing cultivation of coca and heroin
crops in Colombia through the creation of a Colombian Army counternarcotics
brigade, and sharply increased assistance for eradication and alternative development
programs in the country’s two southern provinces of Putumayo and Caquetá, the
region where illegal coca production and a leftist guerrilla presence was expanding
most rapidly.  The ARI expanded assistance to help counter possible spill-over
effects in six nearby countries:  Peru and Bolivia, where past successes in reducing
cocaine production could be threatened by expected progress in eradicating crops in
Colombia; Ecuador, the most exposed neighbor because of its border with
Colombia’s Putumayo province; and Brazil, Venezuela and Panama, where the threat
is primarily confined to common border areas with Colombia.
The region is important to the United States because it includes the three major
drug producing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually all the
world’s cocaine and 60% of the heroin seized in the United States are produced.  It
also includes two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador), members
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which supply
significant quantities of oil to the United States.  While the designated countries have
diverse trading relationships, the United States is the major trading partner by far for
all of them.  For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela,
Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), the Andes mountain range that runs through South
America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration, but the
countries are linked together in the Andean Community economic integration pact.
The ARI countries are some of the most heavily populated in Latin America,
including the first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth (Venezuela), and
eighth (Ecuador) most populous.  Although Colombia and Venezuela have largely
European-Indian mixed race (mestizo) populations, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have
significant Amerindian indigenous populations.
Colombia
Colombia’s spacious and rugged territory, whose western half is transversed by
three parallel  mountain ranges, provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation
and processing, and contributes to the government’s difficulty in exerting control
throughout the nation.  With a population of 41 million, Colombia is the third most
populous country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico.  It is known for a long
tradition of democracy, but also for continuing violence, including a guerrilla
insurgency dating back to the 1960s, and persistent drug trafficking activity.  Recent
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administrations have had to deal with a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist
paramilitary (or “self-defense” forces), both associated with many groups of
independent drug traffickers.  The two main leftist guerrilla groups are the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN) both of whom regularly kidnap individuals for ransoms, and reap profit from
their participation in the drug trade.  The rightist paramilitaries are coordinated by the
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) which has been accused of gross
human rights abuses and collusion with the Colombian Armed Forces in fighting the
FARC and ELN.  The AUC has also been accused of participating in narcotics
trafficking.  There are additional paramilitaries not under the AUC umbrella, such as
Metro Block, a former AUC faction that withdrew from peace negotiations with the
government in late 2002.  
Pastrana Administration.  During the presidency of Andres Pastrana
(August 1998-2002), U.S. involvement in Colombia deepened.  Pastrana was elected
largely on the basis of pledges to bring peace to the country by negotiating with the
guerrillas, strengthening the Colombian military and counternarcotics forces, and
seeking international support for these efforts and other reforms to address the
country’s unusually serious economic difficulties.  Months after Pastrana’s
inauguration, he initiated peace talks with the country’s largest guerrilla group, the
FARC, and later with representatives from the smaller ELN.  In 1999, in cooperation
with the United States, Pastrana developed a $7.5 billion plan called “Plan
Colombia,” with $4 billion to come from Colombia and $3.5 billion from
international donors, although funding from Colombia and the international
community has fallen far short of these goals.
To support Plan Colombia9, the Clinton Administration developed, and the U.S.
Congress approved, a $1.3 billion package of assistance in 2000.  Most of the
funding was to support programs in Colombia, with $416.9 million for helicopters,
training, and other assistance to three Colombian Army counternarcotics battalions.
The focus of most of the funding, while incorporating alternative development and
governance programs, was to support counternarcotics objectives.
Pastrana’s efforts were largely frustrated by a variety of factors, including,
according to a variety of analysts, the lack of a consistent negotiation strategy, the
poor implementation of elements of Plan Colombia, and a lack of interest by the
guerrillas in negotiating peace.  An early Pastrana concession to the FARC was the
creation of a sanctuary area (“despaje”) for the FARC as an incentive to enter into
negotiations.  The outcome, however, was the consolidation of FARC forces in the
area after the withdrawal of government security forces.  Prompted by an
intensification of guerrilla activities, President Pastrana  decided in February 2002
to terminate peace talks with the FARC, and ordered the military to retake the
despaje. Days later, the FARC kidnaped Senator Ingrid Betancourt,  a presidential
candidate with a small following.  She remains a captive to this day.  By the end of
Pastrana’s term, there was a strong perception that peace talks had failed, guerrilla
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activity (fed by the drug trade) had increased, and the security situation in major
cities had deteriorated.
Uribe Administration.10  Alvaro Uribe ran for the presidency on a platform
focusing on defeating the guerrilla insurgents, eliminating the paramilitaries, and
ending narcotics trafficking.  He won 53% of the vote in an eleven-candidate field
in the May 26, 2002 presidential elections.  He is the first president since the 1991
Constitution to win by an outright majority, thus avoiding a run-off election.  Upon
taking office on August 7, 2002, he announced a hard-line approach to negotiations,
declaring that the government would only negotiate with those groups who are
willing to “give up terrorism and agree to a cease-fire,” including paramilitary
groups, with whom President Pastrana had refused to negotiate.  The FARC
increased its armed activities by threatening with death all mayors who did not resign
their posts, and conducting relatively large armed confrontations with rightist
paramilitary groups, resulting in massacres of civilians in several locations.  FARC
also was responsible for bombings in urban areas of Medellín and Cartegena, as well
as a deadly mortar attack in Bogotá close to the Congress building where Uribe was
being sworn in.  These attacks signaled FARC’s new-found, and long-threatened,
ability to take their fight to the cities.
In order to address the complex problems facing Colombia, Uribe took a
number of steps, some of which have proven to be controversial.  He promulgated
a decree invoking emergency powers, allowing the security forces to make arrests
without warrants and imposing controls on movements in war-torn parts of the
country.   Under Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, states of emergency may be declared
for 90 days, and then can be renewed for two additional 90-day periods.  The
country’s constitutional court has, on several occasions, ruled components of the state
of emergency unconstitutional that give security forces increased powers.  In
response, the Uribe Administration introduced legislation in April of 2003 to change
the Constitution to give security forces permanent powers to tap phones and to search
homes without warrants in all parts of the country.
President Uribe also announced plans to increase the size of the military and
police, largely through a one-time 1.2% war tax on wealthy individuals and
businesses, and to create of a “civilian informers” program.  This effort also entails
the augmentation of Colombia’s regular armed forces with “peasant soldiers” who
receive less training than regular troops, and are based near their own hometowns.
The Uribe Administration has inducted 10,000 peasant soldiers, each serving for two
years, with plans to have a total force of 20,000.  Further, Uribe authorized the
widespread aerial fumigation of coca crops, that under the Pastrana administration,
had been limited to small plots of growers who had signed eradication pledges. On
June 26, 2003, a Colombian court ruled that the Colombian government should
immediately suspend its aerial fumigation program until the Environment Ministry
charts an Environment Management Plan.  Officials of the Uribe Administration have
stated that fumigation will continue while it appeals the decision.  Two previous
appeals have been won by the government.
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Uribe has also received approval from the Constitutional Court for a referendum
to cut government spending and pension payments, to prohibit the re-election of
corrupt officials, and to restructure the Colombian Congress by reducing the number
of representatives, restricting its budgetary powers, and allowing it to be dissolved
by popular vote.  The Constitutional Court approved most of these proposals on July
9, 2003, but excluded those relating to extending terms for state governors, mayors,
and town councils by one year; to giving the President authority to grant pardons to
illegal armed groups; and to the criminalization of personal drug use.  The
referendum has been scheduled for October 25, 2003, to coincide with mayoral and
gubernatorial elections slated for the following day.  Days after the date for the
referendum was announced, the FARC threatened to kill all candidates and their
families for the October 26 municipal elections.
In late December 2002, Uribe appointed a commission to explore the possibility
of a dialogue with the AUC.  This initiative grew out of an October 2002 meeting of
Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace and five Roman Catholic bishops with the
AUC leadership, after which the AUC declared an indefinite cessation of hostilities,
in part because of Uribe’s more forceful stance against the guerrillas.  The Bush
Administration, which on September 25, 2002, requested the extradition of two top
AUC leaders, Carlos Castaño and Salvador Mancuso, announced on January 8, 2003,
that it would not withdraw the request.  On July 15, 2003, the Uribe Administration
announced that an agreement had been reached with leaders of the AUC that would
result in their demobilization by the end of 2005.  It is estimated that there are
between 10,000 and 13,000 members of the AUC operating in the country.  Formed
in the 1980s by wealthy cattle ranchers to fight leftist guerrilla groups, the AUC is
a loose coordinating body, leading some observers to question whether negotiations
with the AUC will result in the demobilization of self-defense groups not under the
AUC umbrella.  It is estimated that as many as 6,500 fighters operate outside of the
AUC,11 some of whom are negotiating separately with the government, and others
who are not participating at all.  Related to this effort is a legislative proposal by the
Uribe administration to grant amnesties to illegal combatants in exchange for their
demobilization.
Coca Cultivation and Eradication.  Colombia is the source for 80% of the
world’s cocaine hydrochloride (HCI), and significant quantities of high quality heroin
entering the United States.  While noting the ill effects of the drug trade on the lives
of Colombians, President Uribe linked the drug trade and the guerrilla insurgency as
intertwined problems that must be addressed in a coordinated fashion.  Reflecting
this sentiment, the United States began, in 2002, providing Colombia with the
flexibility to use U.S. counterdrug funds for a unified campaign to fight drug
trafficking and terrorist organizations.  (The State Department has designated  the
FARC, ELN, and AUC as terrorist organizations.)
Upon taking office, Uribe announced that aerial eradication and alternative
development would form a significant basis of the government’s efforts.  The Plan
Colombia eradication spraying program began in December 2000 with operations by
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the U.S. funded counternarcotics brigade in Putumayo.12 Despite early indications
that coca cultivation had increased by 25% in 2001 even though a reported 22,200
acres had been sprayed, Colombian and U.S. officials have reported decreases of
15% in 2002.   During 2002, acres devoted to coca cultivation decreased from nearly
420,000 acres in 2001 to 357,000 acres in 2002.  Colombia reported that an
additional 160,000 acres had been sprayed in the first five months of 2003.
Similarly, cultivation of opium poppy declined by 24% in 2002, with an additional
4,000 acres sprayed in the first five months of 2003.
Aerial fumigation has been controversial.  Critics charge that it has unknown
environmental and health effects, and that it deprives farmers of their livelihood,
particularly in light of a lack of coordination with alternative development programs.
The alternative development program, in which farmers can get assistance to grow
substitute crops after agreeing to the eradication of their illicit crops, has been
plagued with delays.  A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report attributed the
program’s obstacles to inadequate security in coca-growing areas, where the
Colombian governments lacks control, and to the government’s limited ability to
carry out sustained interdiction operations.  The State Department’s annual
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2002 claims that since the
inception of the Alternative Development program in December 2000, 20,128
families have benefitted and nearly 39,000 acres of licit crops have been planted in
previous coca and poppy areas. The Colombian government reported that 38,000
families in 33 municipalities signed voluntary eradication pacts.   As of early 2002,
media reports noted that less than a third of those families have received any
compensation and many were still growing coca.13  
Proponents argue that both eradication and alternative development programs
need time to work.  In its response to the GAO report, AID argued that alternative
development programs do not achieve drug crop reduction on their own, and that the
Colombia program was designed to support the aerial eradication program and to
build “the political support needed for aerial eradication efforts to take place.”  At the
start of his Administration, Uribe announced that increased Colombian resources
would be devoted to alternative development.
With regard to environmental and health consequences, the Secretary of State
certified in 2002, as required by Congress, that the herbicide, glyphosate, is not
considered to pose unreasonable health or safety risks to humans or the environment.
In the certification, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency confirmed that
application rates of the aerial fumigation program in Colombia are within the
parameters listed on U.S. glyphosate labels.  (A certification required under the
FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Bill has not yet been released.)  However,
press reports indicate that many Colombians believe the health consequences of
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aerial fumigation are grave.14   Furthermore, Ecuador, neighboring Colombia, has
complained that the fumigation program is damaging Ecuadorean crops, rivers, soil
and people’s health, according to its Foreign Minister, Nina Pacari.15
U.S. Policy Debate.   The U.S. policy debate has focused on a number of
related issues, such as the effectiveness and implementation of the program in
general, respect for human rights, the expansion of U.S. support to address what
many consider to be a purely civil conflict, and the level of resources that Colombia,
and other countries are willing to contribute.  Supporters argue that Colombia is a
friendly democracy under siege by powerful armed forces of the left and right fueled
by drug money.  In the context of the global war on terrorism, and with the growing
recognition of the relationship between drug trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency,
proponents argue that Colombia and its neighbors should be supported with
counterterrorism assistance before the situation deteriorates further.  They favored
expanding the scope of military assistance to strengthen the ability of Colombian
security forces to combat the leftist guerrillas and to expand their control throughout
rural areas, thereby undercutting the rationale and support for paramilitary groups.
Opponents of U.S. policy argue that  the counterdrug program uses a repressive
and military approach to curbing drug production.  They argue for halting aerial
fumigation of coca crops and aid to the Colombian military, believing that coca
farmers cannot be expected to abandon coca farming voluntarily until adequate
economic alternatives are in place.  They fear that forcing such farmers to give up
coca growing will only drive many to the ranks of the armed groups, or to become
displaced persons dependent on the state.16  Instead, they support a policy that focuses
largely on economic and social aid to combat the conflict’s root causes, curbs the still
rampant human rights abuses by paramilitary groups, provides vigorous support for
a negotiated end to the fighting, and emphasizes illicit drug demand reduction in the
United States.  They also argue that assisting Colombia to fight its leftist guerrillas
will involve the United States in a major guerrilla conflict of indeterminate duration.
Others, some of whom support current U.S. policy, argue for a
“Colombianization” of the program in that they believe that Colombians should be
conducting the aerial spraying and other counternarcotics activities, not U.S.
government contractors, and for Colombia itself to do more to fight its own war
against terrorism and drug trafficking.  They have argued that any expansion of U.S.
involvement should await a greater commitment by Colombia’s government and
elites to the war effort, including a larger budget for the Colombian military.  Still
others argue that assistance to Colombia should have the effect of improving its
economy and providing employment for Colombians, maintaining that the current
implementation in which U.S. contractors are hired does not contribute to the
economy or employment.
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Debate in the United States has also focused on allegations of human rights
abuses by the Colombian Armed Forces, the FARC and ELN, and the paramilitary
groups.  The Colombian security forces have often turned a blind eye to paramilitary
activities, considering these groups as augmenting their fight against the FARC and
ELN, despite a record of human rights abuses.  Many policymakers, both supporters
and opponents of U.S. policy, have worked to break the ties between the Colombian
military and the AUC, and President Uribe has vowed that paramilitary activities will
not be tolerated.  U.S. policy has supported the creation and assistance for a Human
Rights Unit within the Attorney General’s office.  Some non-governmental groups
have claimed that the unit is ineffective and has poor leadership.17  They argue for
full enforcement of legislative conditions that require concrete steps to prosecute
members of the armed forces who commit human rights violations, or who tolerate
activities of paramilitary organizations.  Requirements for the U.S. Secretary of State
to certify that the Colombian military is prosecuting human rights violators, and
breaking ties with the paramilitaries, are longstanding provisions in legislation.
These certifications, the latest one issued on July 8, 2003, are criticized by human
rights organizations as not adequately reflecting the human rights situation.18
Concerns in the United States have also been fueled by several incidents in
which U.S. citizens have been killed or kidnaped in the region.  On April 20, 2001,
a private aircraft flying over Peru and carrying American missionaries was shot
down, killing two, after the Peruvian military, working with U.S. support, identified
it as a possible drug trafficking flight.  As a result, the so-called “Air-Bridge Denial
Program” was halted in both Peru and Colombia, until the Secretary of State certified
that a renewed program would incorporate safety enhancements.  This determination
was made on August 18, 2003.  Having reached an agreement with Colombian
authorities on operational aspects that would provide greater safeguards against
accidental shootdowns, the program was operationally capable of resuming as of
August 22.  Concern also heightened that greater U.S. involvement will result in a
protracted commitment in a civil conflict occurred in response to the loss of five U.S.
civilian contractors and aircraft operating in Colombia since February 2003.  In the
first incident, in February, a Cessna 208 aircraft carrying both U.S. and Colombian
personnel crashed in a FARC controlled region.  One American and a Colombian
were killed, and  three are being held by the FARC.  Another Cessna 208, with U.S.
civilian contractors, crash landed in March during a subsequent search and rescue
operation, killing three Americans. A fifth American contractor was killed on April
7 when his T-65 air tractor crashed during a spraying operation.
A further concern of policymakers has centered on current U.S. policy opposing
the application of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to U.S. citizens.
Countries who had not agreed to sign so-called “article 98 agreements” referring to
Article 98 of the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, preventing the
ICC from proceeding with a request for surrender of U.S. personnel present in the
country, are subject to a cutoff of U.S. military assistance.  On July 1, 2003, the Bush
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Administration announced that it was suspending aid to Colombia and a number of
other countries.  For FY2003, this affects about $5 million in unobligated military
assistance, and it could affect up to $111 million in FY2004 funding.  This action
was required under the American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, which
was incorporated as Title II of H.R. 4775, the FY2002 Supplemental Appropriations
Bill. (P.L. 107-206)
Funding and Requests for Colombia.   
! Under the P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia funding, Colombia received
$860.3 million.  Of that, $424.9 was State Department funding and
$91.8 was Department of Defense funding to assist Colombian
military anti-drug efforts through interdiction support and the
training and equipping of the Colombian counternarcotics battalions.
The remaining $435.4 was State Department funding for assistance
to the Colombian police, economic and alternative development
assistance, assistance for displaced persons, human rights,
administration of justice and other governance programs.
! Under  ARI allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $379.9
million in ACI funding, with $243.50 million in counternarcotics
assistance, and $137 million in economic and social programs.  
! Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental, the Administration
requested $4 million of International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funding for police post support in areas of
weak government control, $6 million of FMF funding (which
Congress directed to be transferred to the INCLE account) for
counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 million of
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Demining (NATD) funding
for counter-kidnapping training.  The enacted legislation specifically
provided $6 million for infrastructure protection for the Cano-Limón
Coveñas oil pipeline, and fully funded the other accounts.
! For FY2003, the Administration requested $537 million in ARI
funding for Colombia, including $439 million in ACI funding, and
$98 million in FMF funding to train and equip a Colombian army
brigade to protect an oil pipeline in the country.   Congress reduced
this request by $5 million, providing $93 million in FMF funds for
the oil pipeline, as well as $433 million in ACI funding.
! In the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental, the President
requested additional funding for Colombia.  Congress approved
$105.1 million, consisting of $34 million of State Department for the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $34 million of DOD funds for Drug
Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, and fully funded the
Foreign Military Financing Program, out of which it provided that
$20 million could be transferred to the ACI account.  The
Administration advised Congress that it had designated another
$17.1 million in FMF funds for Colombia.
CRS-16
19 For more details, see CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery from Crisis, by Maureen
Taft-Morales.
20  See Scott Wilson, Peruvian President Gets Mixed Reviews, Washington Post, March 31,
2003, p. A9.
21 See The International Criminal Court and U.S. Military Assistance, by Jennifer Elsea and
Larry Nowels, on the website of the CRS electronic briefing book on Foreign Operations
Appropriations at [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/apfor40.html].
! For FY2004, the Administration has requested a total of $573
million of which $463 million is for the ACI, consisting of $150
million for alternative development, humanitarian assistance and
institution building, and  $313 million for narcotics interdiction and
eradication programs.  The overall request also includes $110
million in FMF funding.  In addition, the Administration proposes
$1.6 million in International Military Education and Training
(IMET) funds.
Peru
Peru, which shares its northern border with Colombia, is the fifth most populous
country in Latin America, with 27.5 million inhabitants.  President Alejandro Toledo
was elected on June 3, 2001, with 53% of the vote, against former left-leaning
President Alan Garcia with 47%.  A longtime  opposition leader to previous
President Alberto Fujimori who fled the country on corruption charges, Toledo was
inaugurated as President on July 28, 2001.19  President Toledo promised to end
corruption and to stabilize the economy through orthodox policies, but observers
have worried that tangible results will not meet the expectations of the populace,
especially poor, indigenous groups.  The President has had to deal with many strikes
and protests, his party fared poorly in the November 2002 elections for new regional
governments, and his popularity reached new lows in 2003.20  President Toledo
labeled drug trafficking a national security problem for Peru and established a drug
czar for the country to better coordinate counternarcotics initiatives.  When President
Bush visited Peru on March 23, 2002, the two Presidents agreed to enhance
cooperation on counternarcotics and counter-terrorism issues.  However, U.S.
military aid to Peru was suspended on July 1, 2003, because Peru had not signed an
agreement exempting U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court, which would result in the loss of $2.7 million in military equipment and
training requested for FY2004.21
Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into the
circumstances and procedures leading to an incident on April 20, 2001, in which a
Peruvian military plane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary
woman and her infant daughter, after a CIA surveillance plane had indicated that the
small craft might be involved in drug trafficking activities.  As a result of this
accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombia was
suspended pending clarification of procedures.  The State Department released a
report of the U.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that
“communications systems overload” and “cumbersome procedures” played a role in
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the accident.  President Bush indicated during his March 2002 trip to Peru that talks
were continuing between the countries on appropriate procedures before the renewal
of the anti-drug surveillance flights.  Current U.S. law requires the Secretary of State
to notify Congress 30 days prior to resuming U.S. support for the air interdiction
program and to provide assurances that greater safety enhancements are in place.
When the White House announced the resumption of the aerial interdiction program
with Colombia on August 19, 2003, Administration spokesmen stated that
arrangements with Peru had not been completed and that the proposed program with
Peru would be more limited.22 
Peru is the second largest cocaine producer in the world and exports high purity
cocaine and cocaine base to markets in South America, Mexico, Europe, and the
United States.  Nevertheless, it has been viewed as a success story in counternarcotics
efforts because six years of joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations,
aggressive eradication efforts, and alternative development programs have
significantly reduced coca production.  However, while coca production remained
constant in 2001, the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report noted an 8% increase in production during 2002, although this level is still
36,000 hectares (88,956 acres) below 1995 levels.  Facing mounting protests, the
Peruvian government temporarily suspended the drug eradication program in the
Upper Huallaga Valley in early July 2002, but resumed the program in September
2002 once concerns were addressed, in part to be eligible for Andean Trade
Preference Act benefits.  
Peruvian spokesmen have worried about spillover effects of illicit drug activities
from Colombia into Peru, and the increase in coca production.  They have denounced
illicit plantings of coca and poppies in Peru, and international trafficking of arms
through Peru to FARC guerrillas in Colombia.  Responding to press reports that
FARC forces have penetrated into Peruvian territory, Peruvian officials stated in
early 2002 that there are no permanent FARC forces in Peru, but they conceded that
they may cross temporarily into border areas.  Because of these threats, Peru has
moved military bases from its border with traditional rival Ecuador, where tensions
have diminished, to the border with Colombia.  The March 20, 2002 bombing of a
shopping center near the U.S. Embassy in Lima, three days before President Bush’s
visit to Peru, raised fears of a resurgence of guerrilla groups. 
Funding and Requests for Peru.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding, Peru received $25 million for KMAX helicopters for the
Peruvian National Police, and benefitted from regional interdiction
funding.  
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! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Peru received $142.5 million in
ACI funds, with $75 million in counternarcotics aid and $67.5
million for alternative development.  In addition, Peru received
$23.7 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $15 million in
Development Assistance, and $14.5 million in Economic Security
Funds.  No funds were requested for Peru in the FY2002
supplemental.
! Under the ARI allocation  for FY2003, Peru is to receive $128.1
million in ACI funds, with $59.5 million in counternarcotics aid and
$68.6 million for alternative development.   In addition, it would
receive nearly $22 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $16.3
million in Development Assistance, and $9 million in Economic
Support Funds. 
! For FY2004, the Administration has requested $116 million in ACI
funds, with $66 million in counternarcotics aid and $50 million for
alternative development.  In addition, the Administration proposes
$16.7 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $15.3 million in
Development Assistance, and $9 million in Economic Security
Funds.
Bolivia
Landlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but Bolivia’s significant
gains in reducing illegal coca production could be threatened by any successes in
controlling production in Colombia.  Once the world’s foremost producer of coca
leaf, Bolivia made great strides in reducing coca cultivation under the Banzer-
Quiroga administration (1997-2002).23   However, forcible eradication of coca has
become a source of social discontent, exacerbating tensions over class and ethnicity
that may foment political instability in Latin America’s poorest country.     
With a population of 8.3 million, Bolivia is the eleventh most populous country
in Latin America.  Despite a long past history of instability, Bolivia has, since the
mid-1980s, experienced a period of unprecedented political stability as a series of
elected governments instituted extraordinary political changes and economic
liberalization, and peacefully transferred power to their successors. Beginning in the
mid-1990s, governments have carried out major privatization programs and reforms
that were heralded as putting the country on a sound macroeconomic footing, but
have also led to significant social dislocations.   Economically, it is tied to the region
through two organizations - the Andean Community, and as an associate member of
the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) formed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay
and Uruguay.
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President Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, of the National Revolutionary Movement
(MNR) a 72-year old wealthy businessman who has served once before as president
(1993-1997), began his 5-year term on August 6, 2002, with only 22% of the vote in
an eleven candidate field.  Evo Morales, a 42-year old Aymara, who is head of the
Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party and leader of the Bolivian coca growers
union, ran a close second.  Under the Bolivian constitution, the lack of a majority
victory sent  the election to the Bolivian Congress, where Members of the upper and
lower chambers (27 senators and 130 representatives) selected between the two top
vote getters. To secure the presidency, the MNR formed a coalition with the
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), led by fourth place winner Jaime Paz
Zamora, Sanchez de Lozada’s traditional adversary and also a former president
(1989-1993).  During his first year in office, President Losada has had to deal with
numerous protests and demonstrations. 
Shortly after Sanchez de Lozada’s inauguration, his Interior Minister announced
the government would resume the eradication efforts of the previous government.
Perhaps foreshadowing challenges to come, both domestically and in relations with
the United States, confrontations erupted the next day between peasants and police
in the coca-growing Chapare and Yungas regions.  
For some 20 years, U.S. relations with Bolivia have centered largely on
controlling the production of coca leaf and coca paste, which was usually shipped to
Colombia to be processed into cocaine.  In support of Bolivia’s counternarcotics
efforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative
development assistance, and it has forgiven all of Bolivia’s debt for development
assistance projects, and most of the debt for food assistance. Not until President
Hugo Banzer set a goal in his “Dignity Plan” of eliminating illegal coca cultivation
and narco-trafficking by the end of his 5 year term in 2002, was there much success.
Bolivia, like Peru, has been viewed by many as a counternarcotics success story, with
joint air and riverine interdiction operations, successful eradication efforts, and
effective alternative development programs reducing illegal coca cultivation to the
lowest level in 5 years, with a net reduction of approximately 70% between 1996 and
2001.  Others, however, view the forced eradication as a social and political disaster:
in places it was implemented regardless of the availability of alternative development
programs funding, and in some places the Dignity Plan’s mandated use of the
military to carry out the eradications has generated charges of human rights abuses.24
 The Bolivian government has not reached an agreement exempting U.S. citizens
from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, but in July 2003,the Bush
Administration waived the withholding of U.S. military aid from the country.  
According to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, coca cultivation increased 23% in 2002.  Nearly 12,000 hectares (29,652
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acres) was eradicated, but the authorities have had little success in preventing
replantings.  Yet, Bolivia’s coca cultivation is about half of its 1995 levels.  It should
also be noted that Bolivian law allows up to 12,000 hectares of coca cultivation for
traditional use.  Although President Jorge Quiroga had promised to carry out the
Dignity Plan program, he relented after violent protests by coca growers in the
Yungas and the Chapare regions. The latter was once the country’s primary illegal
coca-growing region. Much of the illegal commercial crop had been eliminated there,
but some has been replanted. 
 Sanchez de Lozada faces several crucial decisions related to the coca  issue.
Critics, and even some who have supported the program, claim that while eradication
has been successful in dramatically reducing coca cultivation, it has cost the overall
economy several hundred million dollars annually. This cost is considerable in a
country where GDP growth in 2002 was predicted to tally only 1%.   Another critical
decision for the new president will be  how to proceed with a foreign investment
proposal to construct and operate a $5-$6 billion Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) export
facility.  The intent has been to supply LNG to California from this field by 2006.
In connection with the project, Bolivia would like to develop a bilateral trade
agreement with the United States.
Funding and Requests for Bolivia.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding, Bolivia received $25 million for regional interdiction
assistance and $85 million in alternative development assistance.  
! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Bolivia received $87.6 million
in ACI funds, consisting of $52 million in drug interdiction and
eradication, and $35.6 million in alternative development. In
addition, Bolivia received $19.7 million in Child Survival and
Health funds, $12.9 million in Development Assistance, $10 million
in Economic Support Funds,  and $500,000 in Foreign Military
Financing. 
! Under the FY2003 ARI allocation, Bolivia is to receive nearly $91
million in ACI funding, consisting of $49 million in interdiction and
eradication, and $41.7 million in alternative development.  In
addition, Bolivia would receive $18.5 million in Child Survival and
Health funds, $12.2 million in Development Assistance, $10 million
in Economic Support Funds, and $2 million in Foreign Military
Financing. 
! For FY2004, the Administration has requested $91 million in ACI
funds, consisting of $52.5 million in interdiction and eradication,
and $38.5 million in alternative development.  In addition, the
Administration proposes $14.4 million in Child Survival and Health
funds, $11.4 million in Development Assistance, $8 million in
Economic Support Funds, and $4 million in Foreign Military
Financing.
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Ecuador
On Colombia’s southern border, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia’s
neighbors because it is situated adjacent to areas in southern Colombian that are
guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas. With a population of 13.2
million, Ecuador is the eighth most populous country in Latin America.  President
Lucio Gutierrez, a retired colonel and a leader of the January 2000 uprising which
toppled the previously elected President, Gustavo Noboa, was elected on November
20, 2002, and inaugurated on January 15, 2003.  He has embarked upon a very
ambitious program to cut government expenditures, and in March 2003, he obtained
a $205 million stand-by arrangement from the International Monetary Fund and the
extension of repayments on past obligations to help the country deal with its debt
problems.
According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory
for rest, recuperation, and medical treatment, and there are reports that Colombians
are buying ranches and farms in the Ecuadoran border region, possibly for drug
cultivation.  Ecuadoran officials say they have uncovered and destroyed several small
cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoran border region is experiencing a
constant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighters with
Colombian paramilitary organizations have been arrested for running extortion rings
in Ecuadorian border regions.  The FARC has been accused of kidnaping people in
Ecuador, although the FARC denies the allegations.  Ecuador reinforced its northern
border with Colombia in early 2002 as Colombian anti-guerrilla operations
intensified following the breakdown of the peace talks, and Ecuador was said to be
seeking additional international assistance.25  President Gutierrez has said that the
armed conflict in Colombia is having an adverse affect on Ecuadoran peasants in
border areas, and he has claimed that the aerial fumigation in Colombia is harming
the Ecuadoran environment and negatively affecting Ecuadorans’ health.26
Colombian President Uribe thanked Ecuadoran for taking in Colombians fleeing
violence when he visited Ecuador, on August 22, 2003, and he promised to eradicate
terrorism in Colombia so that it would not spread to Ecuador.27 
As a major transit country for cocaine and heroin from Colombia and Peru,
Ecuador cooperates extensively with the United States in counternarcotics efforts.
In November 1999, the United States signed a 10-year agreement with Ecuador for
a forward operating location (FOL) in Manta, on the Pacific Coast, for U.S. aerial
counterdrug detection and monitoring operations.  Although the agreement is solely
for the detection of drug trafficking flights in the region, some human rights groups
and politicians in Ecuador fear that the facility could be used to support operations
against guerrillas in neighboring Colombia.  
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Ecuador has not signed an agreement to exempt U.S. citizens from the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and it became subject to U.S.
sanctions on July 1, 2003, with the possible loss of $15.7 million in FMF funding and
IMET education in FY2004.  Press reports at the time of the announcement of the
cutoff of military aid quoted some Ecuadoran officials as saying they might
reexamine the military relationship with the United States, including the Manta
facility. 
Funding and Requests for Ecuador.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding Ecuador received $20 million in U.S. assistance, of which
$12 million was to support drug interdiction efforts, and $8 million
was for alternative development  assistance.  Another $61.3 million
has been allocated for the construction of a Forward Operating
Location in Manta, Ecuador for counternarcotics aerial surveillance.
! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $25 million in
ACI funding, consisting of $15 million in interdiction and law
enforcement programs, and $10 million in alternative development.
In addition, Ecuador received $6.9 million in Development
Assistance, $15 million in Economic Support Funds.
! Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Ecuador
received $3 million in FMF funding.
! Under the FY2003 ARI allocations, Ecuador is to receive nearly
$30.9 million in ACI funding, consisting of $15 million for
interdiction and law enforcement programs, and $15.9 million for
alternative development.  In addition, Ecuador would receive $7.1
million in Development Assistance, $15.5 million in Economic
Support Funds, and $1 million in Foreign Military Financing.
! For FY2004, the Administration has requested $35 million in ACI
funding, consisting of  $20 million for interdiction and law
enforcement, and $15 million for alternative development.  In
addition, Ecuador would receive $300,000 in Child Survival and
Health funds, $7.1 million in Development Assistance, $14 million
in Economic Support Funds, and $15 million in Foreign Military
Financing.
Brazil 
Brazil’s isolated Amazon region, populated largely by indigenous groups, forms
Colombia’s southeastern border. With a population of 174.5 million,  Brazil is the
largest and most populous country in Latin America, with most of its inhabitants
concentrated in the more developed southeastern areas of the country and along the
Atlantic coast.  Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the leftist Workers Party was inaugurated
as President on January 1, 2003, after decisively winning the second round
presidential election in October 2002, with support from a wide range of parties.  He
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has promised to follow sound economic policies, while putting priority on the
elimination of hunger in the country.  He is seeking to create a strong South
American bloc that would merge the Southern Common Market (Mercosur),
composed of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (with Bolivia and Chile as associate
members) with the Andean Community, composed of Venezuela, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia.  President Lula da Silva visited Peru on August 25, 2003,
and Peruvian President Toledo signed a free trade agreement between Peru and
Mercosur, and talks for a broader free trade agreement between Mercosur and the
Andean Community are scheduled to conclude by December 2003.  Brazil views
these integration efforts as facilitating more advantageous negotiations with the
United States in the talks to conclude a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by
January 2005.  
In efforts to strengthen ties with the United States, on June 20, 2003, President
Lula da Silva made an official visit to Washington, D.C. and he and President Bush
resolved “to create a closer and qualitatively stronger [bilateral] relationship.”
Leaders agreed on a framework for regular high-level discussions on a wide range of
issues, including agreements to enhance cooperation in science and nuclear energy;
to jointly promote HIV/AIDS treatment in the Portuguese-speaking African countries
of Mozambique and Angola; and to establish an energy partnership for cooperation
on alternative energy sources.  Brazil has not agreed to exempt U.S. citizens from the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and in July 2003 it became subject
to sanctions that could result in the loss of $500,000 in IMET military education and
training funds in FY2004.   
Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, but it is a conduit for the
transit of cocaine base and cocaine HC1 from Colombia to Europe and the United
States.  With increasing drug use within the country, a major action in 2002 was the
passage of an omnibus Brazilian federal counter-narcotics law.
Brazilians have long been concerned about the sparsely populated territory in
the huge Amazon region, and they have been fearful historically of foreign designs
and intervention in this territory.  In an effort to exercise control over this vast
territory Brazil has constructed a $1.4 billion sensor and radar project called the
Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM from its acronym in Portuguese, and it has
offered to share data from this system with neighbors and the United States.  It has
established a military base at Tabatinga, with 25,000 soldiers and policemen, with
air force and navy support, and has launched Operation Cobra with heightened
vigilance to deal with spillover effects from Colombia.  
Press accounts suggest evidence of Colombian drug traffickers encouraging
indigenous communities in Brazil to plant coca, Brazilian drug traffickers linked to
Colombian traffickers, and FARC incursions along the border.  In one example in
late 1998, the FARC captured a city on the Colombian border, forcing Colombian
troops to withdraw into Brazilian territory, before recapturing the city.  In another
example, a plane from Suriname with arms for FARC guerrillas was discovered
when it was forced to make an emergency landing in Brazil.  In another more recent
example, FARC forces crossed into Brazil in early March 2002 and exchanged
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gunfire with Brazilian military forces.28  In late June 2003, Brazil announced that it
would increase the number of troops in states that share a border with Colombia.  In
another strange incident, it was reported in August 2003 that French officials landed
a C-130 plane in Brazilian territory in mid-July 2003, without informing Brazilian
authorities, in an effort to rescue Ingrid Betancourt, a former Colombian presidential
candidate who is also a French citizen, who has been held captive by FARC
guerrillas.29 
Funding and Requests for Brazil.
! Brazil received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,
but under  ARI allocations for FY2002 Brazil received $6 million in
ACI funds, nearly all in law enforcement funding.  Brazil also
received $9.2 million in Child Survival and Health funds, and $4.8
million in Development Assistance.
! Under the FY2003 ARI allocation, Brazil is to receive $6 million in
ACI funds, nearly all in law enforcement funding.  In addition,
Brazil is to receive $9.8 million in Child Survival and Health funds,
and $6.4 million in Development Assistance. 
!  FY2004, the Administration requested $12 million in ACI funding,
nearly all in law enforcement funding.  In addition, the
Administration proposes $12 million in Child Survival and Health
funds, and $8.2 million in Development Assistance.
Venezuela
Venezuela, Colombia’s eastern neighbor, is now the fourth largest supplier of
crude oil to the United States.  With a population of 24 million, Venezuela is the
sixth most populous country in Latin America.  The country is presently led by
President Hugo Chavez, a  populist and leader of an unsuccessful military coup in the
early 1990s, who was initially elected in 1998 on a campaign to rewrite the
constitution, rid the country of corruption, and more adequately meet the needs of the
people. Under President Chavez, Venezuela has undergone enormous political
changes, with a new constitution and revamped political institutions.  
Although Chavez remained widely popular until mid-2001, his popularity
subsequently eroded significantly after that, especially among the middle class,
because of his perceived ineffectiveness in improving living conditions and concerns
that he was imposing a leftist agenda on the country.  Following massive anti-Chavez
protests in April 2002, the Venezuelan military took Chavez into custody and
business leader Pedro Carmona declared himself interim President, but Chavez was
restored to power in days with the support of the military. From December 2002 until
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February 2003, the opposition orchestrated a general strike that disrupted the
economy but was unsuccessful in getting President Chavez to agree to early elections
or a non-binding referendum on his rule.  After months of negotiations facilitated by
OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria, President Chavez and the opposition signed
an agreement on May 29, 2003, to resolve the political crisis. Implementation of the
accord, which could lead to a recall referendum for President Chavez, will not
necessarily be easy, but observers emphasize that it is an important first step for
achieving political stability.30   In August 2003, opposition elements submitted
petitions that will lead to a referendum on Chavez’s rule.
Under the Chavez government, there has been friction at times in U.S.-
Venezuelan relations, and Chavez has at times used anti-U.S. rhetoric. He denounced
Plan Colombia as a U.S.-dominated military strategy, and denied the United States
overflight rights over Venezuela territory for drug interdiction. Following the
September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Chavez criticized U.S. military
action in Afghanistan, and he  visited Libya, Iran, and Iraq, prompting President Bush
to exclude him from his March 2002 meeting with Andean leaders in Peru.31
Venezuelan officials have refused to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, and in July 2003, the country became subject to
sanctions that could lead to the loss of $700,000 in military education and training
funds in FY2004. 
There has been increasing concern about the guerrilla conflict in Colombia
spreading to Venezuela.  At times, Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries have
entered Venezuela territory causing frictions in Colombian-Venezuelan relations.  In
April 2003, Venezuela’s military exchanged fire with Colombian paramilitaries that
had crossed the border pursuing FARC guerrillas; a subsequent meeting between
Chavez and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe eased tensions and led to Venezuelan
promises to increase border patrols in order to prevent incursions by armed
Colombian groups.  There also have been long-held suspicions that President Chavez
has supported the Colombian guerrillas, but President Chavez denies such support.
Venezuela is a major transit route for cocaine and heroin from neighboring
Colombia to the United States and Europe.  In 2001, some coca fields were located
and eradicated, and processing labs were detected and destroyed.  There were no
eradication efforts in 2002.  Despite various policy disagreements with the United
States, the Chavez government has cooperated with the United States in
counternarcotics efforts.  
Funding and Requests for Venezuela.
! While Venezuela received only a small amount of Plan Colombia
assistance, under the final ARI allocations for FY2002, Venezuela
received $5 million in ACI funding, consisting of law enforcement
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and administration of justice programs.  Venezuela also received
$500,000 in Economic Support Funds.
! Under FY2003 ARI allocations, Venezuela would receive $2.1
million in ACI funding, consisting of law enforcement and
administration of justice programs.  Venezuela would also receive
$500,000 in Economic Support Funds.
! For FY2004, the Administration has requested $5 million in ACI
funding, consisting of law enforcement and administration of justice
programs.  The Administration also proposes $500,000 in Economic
Support Funds.
Panama
Panama is separated from Colombia along its southern border by the difficult
and environmentally sensitive wetlands and rain forest of the “Darien Gap.”  Here,
the 16,000 mile Pan American highway (stretching from Alaska to the tip of southern
Chile) is interrupted for a 60 mile stretch.  A part of Colombia until 1903, Panama
is now the twentieth most populous country in Latin America, with a population of
2.8 million.
Panama’s history has been heavily influenced by its strategic location and the
transit of commerce through the Panama Canal in the center of the country, where the
major cities are located.  It is led by President Mireya Moscoso, elected and
inaugurated in 1999, who has been dealing with economic difficulties in Panama, and
with Panama’s new responsibilities for the Panama Canal since the U.S. withdrawal
on the last day of 1999.  Despite considerable effort in the period leading up to the
U.S. withdrawal, Panama was unwilling to allow the United States to retain a formal
military presence in Panama for counternarcotics surveillance purposes.32  This
forced the United States to develop the Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in El
Salvador, Aruba/Curacao and Ecuador as substitute locations for such activities.
U.S.-Panama relations have been very friendly, however, and Panama did agree to
exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court shortly
before President Moscoso’s late June 2003 official visit to Washington, D.C. 
Panama has been the scene of cross-border incursions by Colombian guerrillas
and  paramilitary groups.  There is some evidence that paramilitary groups are being
founded in Panama, with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception
that the Panamanian government has left some areas unprotected.  Shipments of
small arms for the Colombian guerrillas have been seized in Panamanian territory as
well.
Panama is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment
point for illicit drugs, especially cocaine, smuggled from South America, and it is a
major site for money-laundering activity.  In recent years, Panama has cooperated
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with the United States in bilateral counternarcotics efforts, seizing significant
amounts of illicit drugs and enforcing recently passed anti-money laundering
legislation. In early 2002, a comprehensive U.S.-Panama maritime anti-drug
agreement entered into force. 
Funding and Requests for Panama.
 ! While Panama received only a small amount of Plan Colombia
assistance, under  allocations for FY2002, Panama received $5
million in ACI funding, consisting  largely of border control and law
enforcement funds.  Panama also received $4.5 million in
Development Assistance and $4.2 million in Economic Support
Funds.
 ! For FY2003, Panama is to receive $4.5 million in ACI funds,
consisting largely of border control and law enforcement funds.  In
addition, Panama is to receive $4.9 million in Development
Assistance, $3 million in Economic Support Funds, and $1 million
in Foreign Military Financing.
 ! For FY2004, the Administration has requested $9 million in ACI
funds, consisting largely of border control and law enforcement
funds.  In addition, the Administration proposes $5.7 million in
Development Assistance, $3.5 million in Economic Support Funds,
and $2.5 million in Foreign Military Financing.
Major Legislative Activity in 2003 on Andean
Regional Initiative Issues
In 2003, Congress has been acting on a variety of appropriation and
authorization measures related to the Andean region that are cited below.   In April
2003, the Congress passed an FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental, to fund
continuing operations in Iraq, that also included funding for the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative.  Consideration of other measures is continuing.
FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations
By the end of 2002, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had
reported their versions of an  FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill, but this
and other appropriations bills had not been enacted.  As a result, Congress
incorporated the 11 unfinished bills into an omnibus spending package, H.J.Res. 2
(for continuing appropriations).  The House passed H.J.Res. 2 on January 8, 2003,
and the Senate followed suit on  January 28, 2003.  Both chambers approved the
conference report (H.Rept. 108-10) on February 13, 2003, and the measure was
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signed into law (P.L. 108-7) on February 20, 2003.33  In the omnibus bill, Congress
provided $835.5 million for the Andean Regional Initiative, of which $700 million
was provided for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.  It further allowed the transfer
of $31 million from the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) account to the ACI.
FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental
On March 25, 2003, President Bush requested $74.7 billion in additional
funding for military operations and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and for ongoing
operations in the global war on terrorism.  It also included requests for counterdrug
and military funding for Colombia.
House Action.  The House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 1559
on April 2, 2003, providing the President with most of his request.  The House
passed the measure on April 3, 2003, by a vote of 414-12.  During floor
consideration, an amendment offered by Representative Jim McGovern was defeated
by a vote of 209-216.  The amendment would have decreased by $61 million funding
for Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative
for Colombia, and would have increased funding for the Office of Domestic
Preparedness by $34 million.
Senate Action.  The Senate passed H.R. 1559 on April 7, 2003, by a vote of
93-0, after it struck all after the enacting clause and inserted the text of S. 762, the
Emergency Wartime Supplemental, reported out by the Senate Appropriations
Committee on April 1.
Conference Report.  The conference agreement passed both the House and
the Senate on April 12, 2003, and was signed into law on April 16, 2003 (P.L. 108-
11).  With regard to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Colombia, it provided
$34 million for the ACI of which $5 million is to assist persons who have been
displaced as a result of the armed conflict in Colombia.  Further, it provided that up
to $20 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds could be transferred to the
ACI for aircraft, training, and other assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces.
Overall FMF funding totaled $2.059 billion, of which the Administration
subsequently allocated an additional $17.1 million for Colombia.  The Department
of Defense was provided with an additional $34 million for its Drug Interdiction and
Counter-Drug Activities to fund “increased operational tempo in Colombia’s unified
campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities.”  Report language
directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress within 30 days of
enactment detailing how these funds are to be obligated in support of the U.S.
Southern Command’s Colombia initiative.
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FY2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations 
House Action.  The House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee
marked up the FY2004 bill (H.R. 2800/H.Rept. 108-222) on July 10, 2003, which
was followed by full committee consideration on July 16, 2003.  The Committee
approved the President’s request of $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative, and included a number of conditions and reporting requirements.   The
Committee does not earmark funds by country from the Child Survival and Health
programs, Development Assistance, Foreign Military Financing, and Economic
Security Funds (with some exceptions), which comprise components of the Andean
Regional Initiative.  However, the Committee provided additional funding over
FY2003 levels for the Child Survival and Health Program, and moderate increases
for the Economic Support Fund, and Foreign Military Financing programs.
Development Assistance was cut slightly.
As in previous years, the Committee included a number of funding conditions
and reporting requirements.  These provisions include:
! Expanded authority for a unified campaign against narcotics
trafficking, activities of terrorist organizations, and to take actions
to protect human health and welfare in emergency situations,
including rescue operations.  The Committee Report notes, as it has
in previous years, that this authority is not a signal for the United
States to become more deeply involved in assisting the Colombian
military in fighting its terrorist groups, and especially not at the
expense of counternarcotics programs.  Expanded authority is meant
to provide “more effective intelligence gathering and fusion, and to
provide the flexibility to the Department of State when the
distinction between counternarcotics and counterterrorism are [sic]
not clear cut.”
! Expanded authority shall cease if the Secretary of State determines
that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous
operations to restore government authority and respect for human
rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and
guerrilla organizations.  This is similar language to previous years.
! If any helicopters procured with ACI funds are used to aid or abet
the operations of paramilitaries, the helicopters shall be immediately
returned to the United States.  This is similar language to previous
years.
! Support for a Peruvian air interdiction program is denied until the
Secretary of State and Director of Central Intelligence certify to
Congress, 30 days prior to any resumption, that such a program will
include enhanced safeguards and procedures to prevent any similar
occurrence to the April 20, 2001 incident in which two American
missionaries were killed after a plane in which they were flying was
shot down.
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! It requires a report from the State Department and Agency for
International Development within 45 days of the bill’s enactment on
the proposed uses of all ACI funds on a country-by-country basis for
each proposed program, project, or activity.
! It allows for the obligation of  75% of ACI funds without prior
certification from the Secretary of State with regard to human rights.
 To release the remaining 25%, the Secretary must certify that 1) the
Colombian Armed Forces are suspending those who have been
credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights,
or to have aided paramilitary organizations; 2) the Colombian
government is prosecuting military personnel accused of human
rights abuses; 3) the Colombian military is cooperating with civilian
prosecutors and judicial authorities in such cases; 4) the Colombian
military is severing links with paramilitary organizations; and 5) the
Colombian military is executing orders for the capture of
paramilitary leaders.  The Committee directs the Secretary to meet
with internationally recognized human rights organizations prior to
making the certification.
! It directs the Secretary of State to deny visas to any alien who has
provided support to the FARC, ELN, or AUC or has committed or
abetted the commission of gross violations of human rights.
! The report recommends $1 million for the Naval Post Graduate
School (N.S.) to strengthen public engagement and democratic
control of national security in Colombia.
! The report states the Committee’s support for USAID’s continuing
alternative development strategy, and for the so-called “carabineros”
police program to establish a law enforcement presence in rural and
remote areas.
! The report states the Committee’s concern that U.S. assistance is not
adequately reaching the substantial Afro-Colombian population,
which has been significantly affected by the conflict.
! The report states the Committee’s concern with the increase in
Colombian heroin and directs the State Department to consult with
the Committee on its strategy for heroin eradication.
During full committee consideration, Chairman Jim Kolbe accepted an
amendment proposed by Representative Sam Farr to require the State Department to
submit a report no later than 60 days from enactment that describes detailed plans
and programs to train Colombian nationals for the purpose of assuming
responsibilities for programs currently being executed by U.S. contractors with funds
provided in the bill.
H.R. 2800 passed the House on July 23, 2003.  During its consideration, the
House defeated by a 195-226 margin an amendment by Representative Jim
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McGovern and Representative Ike Skeleton to cut $40 million from the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative and $35 million from Foreign Military Financing funds, and
to transfer this $75 million to Child Survival and Health programs. 
Senate Action.  The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out their
bill (S. 1426/S.Rept. 108-106) on July 17, 2003, providing $660 million of the
President’s ACI request, with the authority to transfer an additional $37 million from
the State Department’s INCLE account to ACI.  Of this total of $697 million, the
Committee directed that not less than $250 million be allocated directly to USAID
for alternative development and institution building programs, including judicial
reform.  Of the $250 million, $165 million is directed to these types of programs in
Colombia.  In addition, the Committee earmarked funding for certain programs in
Colombia: $2.5 million to protect human rights defenders; $2.5 million for the
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia;
$10 million for assistance to the Colombian Attorney General’s Human Rights Unit;
and $2.5 million for assistance to the human rights unit of the Colombian
Procuraduria.
Like the House bill, it includes a number of reporting requirements.
! It provides expanded authority for a unified campaign against
narcotics trafficking, activities of terrorist organizations, and to take
actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency situations,
including rescue operations.
! Expanded authority shall cease if the Secretary of State determines
that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous
operations to restore government authority and respect for human
rights in areas under the effective control of the paramilitary and
guerrilla organizations.
! If any helicopters procured with ACI funds are used to aid or abet
the operations of any illegal self-defense group or illegal security
cooperative, the helicopters shall be immediately returned to the
United States.
! It requires a report from the State Department, in consultation with
USAID, within 45 days of the bill’s enactment, on the proposed uses
of all ACI funds on a country-by-country basis for each proposed
program, project or activity.
! Section 664 allows for the obligation of 50% of ACI funds prior to
a certification from the Secretary of State with regard to human
rights.  The release of the remaining 50% would be in two
installments:  the first after such a certification; the second after July
31, 2004, with an additional certification.  Specifically, the Secretary
must certify that (1) the Colombian Armed Forces are suspending
personnel who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross
violations of human rights, including extra-judicial killings, or to
have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; (2) the Colombian
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government is investigating and prosecuting members of the
Colombian Armed Forces who have been credibly alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights; (3) the Colombian
Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial
authorities in such cases; (4) the Colombian Armed Forces are
severing links with paramilitary organizations; and 5) the Colombian
Armed Forces are dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial
networks by arresting commanders and financial backers.  The
Committee directs the Secretary of State to meet with internationally
recognized human rights organizations at least 10 days prior to
making these certifications.
! Section 665 directs the Secretary of State to deny visas to any alien
who has provided support to the FARC, ELN, or AUC, or has
committed or abetted the commission of gross violations of human
rights.
! It continues previously enacted provisions that would prohibit not
more than 20% of funds to be used for the procurement of chemicals
for aerial coca and poppy fumigation unless the Secretary of State,
in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency, certifies that (1) the herbicide mixture is being
used in accordance with EPA label requirements for comparable use
in the United States and with the Colombian Environmental
Management Plan; (2) the herbicide mixture, in the manner it is
being used, does not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to
humans or the environment; and (3) complaints of harm to health or
licit crops caused by fumigation are evaluated and fair compensation
is being paid for meritorious claims.  It also states that these funds
may not be used unless programs are being implemented by USAID,
the government of Colombia, or other organizations, to provide
alternative sources of income in areas where security permits for
small-acreage farmers whose illicit crops are targeted for fumigation.
! It prohibits any U.S. Armed Forces personnel or U.S. civilian
contractors employed by the United States from participating in any
combat operation in Colombia.
! It commends the commitment of Colombian President Uribe in
tackling the threats of terrorism and narcotics in Colombia.
! It includes language maintaining the existing caps on U.S. personnel
in Colombia at 400 for military and 400 for civilian contractors.
! It commends the Colombian National Police for reasserting its
presence throughout the country and provides $17 million in FMF
funds for three DC-3 aircraft to increase their mobility.  The
Committee report notes that it sees “the Colombian military as a
particularly weak link in the fight against terrorism and narcotics.”
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! It requires a report from the Secretary of State, not less than 90 days
from enactment, that describes (1) the budgetary impact for fiscal
years 2004 through 2007 of State Department and other relevant
agencies of Plan Colombia and Andean Counterdrug Initiative
activities, including the projected cost per year of maintaining and
operating equipment, including aircraft, that the United States has
provided to Colombia; (2) the progress, to date, that the United
States has made in turning over management and implementation of
Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative programs
from U.S. personnel to the Colombian government; and (3) the exit
strategy that would transfer such programs and activities to the
Colombian government.
! It continues the so-called “Leahy Amendment” that prohibits
funding for any units of security forces if the Secretary of State has
credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of
human rights.
! It makes U.S. assistance to the Bolivian police or military contingent
on a report from the Secretary of State that (1) the Bolivian
government is vigorously investigating and prosecuting members of
the military and police who have been credibly alleged to have
committed gross violations of human rights and is punishing those
found to have committed such violations; and (2) the Bolivian
military and police are cooperating with such investigations and
prosecutions.
FY2004-FY2005 Foreign Relations Authorization
House Action.  Reflecting continuing concern with the persistent and complex
conflict in Colombia, the spill-over of guerrilla and drug trafficking activities into
neighboring countries, and the ongoing  involvement of the United States (including
the kidnaping and killing of American citizens), the House International Relations
Committee reported out H.R. 1950, (H.Rept. 108-105, Part 1) on May 16, 2003, with
three reporting requirements similar to provisions in the Foreign Relations
Authorization for FY2003 (H.R. 1646/P.L. 107-228), and with the provision of
additional authority related to the interdiction of illicit arms trafficking. 
Section 703 of the bill as reported by the House International Relations
Committee would require the Secretary of State, after consulting with internationally
recognized human rights organizations, to make a very detailed report to Congress,
not later than 30 days after enactment and every 180 days thereafter, on the specific
measures that the Colombian authorities are taking to apprehend and prosecute
leaders of paramilitary organizations and other terrorist organizations.  The
Committee report expressed concern about the illegal activities not only of two leftist
guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN), but also of the rightist paramilitary groups,
specifically the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), that are reported to
be responsible for at least half of all non-combatant killings, torture, and
disappearances.  Noting that the State Department’s March 2003 human rights report
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found some continuing collusion  with the AUC by members of the Colombian
security forces, the Committee report stated that Colombia’s government has not
committed at every level to confront the paramilitaries and to protect civilians from
paramilitary abuses.
Section 709 would require the Secretary of State to submit a report on the
impact of the U.S. assistance plan known as Plan Colombia on Ecuador and
Colombia’s neighboring countries to appropriate congressional committees not later
than 30 days after enactment.  This report is to set forth a comprehensive strategy for
United States activities in Colombia, with specific reference to the impact of U.S.
assistance on Ecuador and other adjacent countries, and it is to provide the reasons
for the failure to submit a report on this subject as required by the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FY2003. Stating that a State Department report of March 4,
2003, was inadequate, the Committee report expressed the expectation that a new
report “will address in detail not only the counter-drug repercussions of Plan
Colombia and its successor programs on Ecuador and other adjacent countries, but
also the humanitarian and economic development implications of increased
eradication efforts for these countries.”
Section 1801 would provide specific authority for U.S. counter-drug assistance
which is being used to support the interdiction of aerial trafficking of illicit narcotics
to be used to support the interdiction of  illicit arms in connection with illicit drug
trafficking.  The Committee report notes that “this provision ensures that any and all
illegal arms brought into Colombia by aerial means that are in any way trafficked in
connection with the illicit drug trade, are also clearly eligible for U.S. assistance in
interdicting.”
Section 1802 would require the Secretary of State, acting through the
Department of State’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in Bogotá, Colombia, to
ensure, not later than 180 days after enactment, “that all pilots participating in the
United States opium eradication program in Colombia are Colombians and are fully
trained, qualified and experienced pilots, with preference provided to individuals who
are members of the Colombian National Police.”  The Committee report states that
local Colombian police anti-drug pilots are more familiar with the terrain and can be
more effective in locating crops, thereby enhancing efforts to eradicate the small but
potent opium crop that makes up nearly two-thirds of U.S. heroin use, according to
recent United States estimates, while promoting the Colombianization of the
programs and reducing the involvement of U.S. private contractors.
On July 16, 2003, the House passed H.R. 1950 by a vote of 382-42.
Senate Action.  On April 24, 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported out S. 925 (S.Rept. 108-39), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
2004, with one provision related to Colombia and the Andean region.  Responding
to a request from the Executive Branch, Section 801 of the bill would repeal the
requirement in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for FY2000 (P.L.
106-246) that the State Department report semi-annually on the extradition of
narcotics traffickers from Andean countries.  
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In floor action on S. 925 on July 10, 2003, the Senate approved two
amendments related to Colombia and Andean region assistance, both by voice vote.
Amendment 1162, proposed by Chairman Luger, added Section 815, which
would modify the reporting requirements on U.S. personnel involved in the anti-
narcotics campaign in Colombia by changing the frequency of the reports from
bimonthly to quarterly, and by clarifying that the reports were to be provided to
appropriate committees of Congress.
Amendment 1194, proposed by Majority Leader First, added Section 2522,
which would commend the leadership and people of Colombia for the progress made
against illicit drug traffickers and terrorists, and which supported the efforts of
President Uribe and the government and the people of Colombia to preserve and
strengthen democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity in Colombia.
FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization
Senate Action.  On May 29, 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported out S. 1161, the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act of 2004 (S.Rept. 108-
1161), with several provisions on assistance to Colombia and the Andean region.
Section 122 would authorize $700 million (rather than the $731 million
requested) for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.  It  provides that assistance for
Colombia for FY2004 and previous years may be used to support a unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities; and to take actions to protect
human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue
operations.  It further provides that U.S. personnel providing such assistance shall be
subject to the personnel caps in the Emergency Supplemental Act for 2000, shall not
participate in any combat operation in connection with such assistance; and shall be
subject to the condition that  Colombia is fulfilling its commitment to the United
States with respect to its human rights practices, including specific conditions set
forth in the Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2003.
Section 502 provides that information on the extent of involvement of U.S.
businesses in counter-narcotics activities under State or Defense Department
contracts, required by the previous Foreign Relations Authorization, may be reported
in the annual report detailing the counter-narcotics performance of drug producing
and drug transit countries. 
FY2004 National Defense Authorization
House Action.  On April 4, 2003, Representative Duncan Hunter introduced
H.R. 1588, authorizing appropriations for FY2004 for the Department of Defense.
The Committee on Armed Services reported the bill on May 16, 2003, with
provisions relating to Colombia (H.Rept. 108-106).  The House considered H.R.
1588 on May 20, and 21, with final passage on May 22.  With regard to Colombia,
Section 1208 of the bill would increase the cap on the number of U.S. military
personnel in Colombia to 500, from 400 in existing law.  It would provide an
exemption from the limitation for any members of the armed forces in Colombia to
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rescue or retrieve U.S. military or civilian personnel.  This limitation could not be
exceeded for a period longer than 30 days.  The provision also exempts from the cap
(1) military personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Colombia as attaches, as part
of the security assistance office, with the Marine Corps security contingent, (2)
personnel participating in natural disaster relief operations, and (3) those involved in
non-operational transit through Colombia.  The Secretary of Defense is provided with
authority to waive these limitations if he deems it in the national security interests of
the United States, and with notification to congressional defense committees within
15 days.
Section 1047 of the bill would provide authorization for drug interdiction and
counterdrug activities to provide assistance to Colombia to support a unified
campaign against drug trafficking and activities by organizations designated as
terrorist organizations.
Senate Action.  On May 13, 2003, Senator John Warner introduced S. 1050,
the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2004.  On June 4, 2003, the Senate
took up H.R. 1588, striking all after the enacting clause and inserting the text of S.
1050. The measure passed the Senate by voice vote the same day and conference
committee consideration is pending.  With regard to Colombia and the Andean
region, Section 1207 of the bill extends the authority of Section 1033 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-84) which authorizes
DOD counternarcotics programs.  It also would renew authority to support
counterdrug activities in  Peru which had expired at the end of FY2002.  The section
also authorizes counternarcotics support through the end of FY2006 for seven
additional countries, including Bolivia and Ecuador, among others, with $40 million
for each authorized in any fiscal year.  The bill directs the Secretary of Defense to
provide a comprehensive report on how counterdrug funds are spent in each of these
nine countries within 60 days following the end of each fiscal year for which the
program is authorized.
Section 1208 of the bill would extend for two additional years the expanded
authority to use DOD funds to support a unified campaign against narcotics
cultivation and trafficking, and against terrorist organizations in Colombia.
FY2004 Intelligence Authorization
House Action.  On June 11, 2003, Representative Porter Goss introduced
H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for FY2004.  It was reported (H.Rept.
108-163) from the Committee on Intelligence on June 17, 2003, and  approved by the
House on June 27, 2003, by a vote of 410-9.  In regard to Colombia, Section 501
authorizes funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities, with provisions
similar to the Senate bill regarding a unified campaign, a prohibition on participation
of U.S. military and contract employees, and caps on U.S. military and contract
personnel. (See below.)  The report accompanying the bill notes the Committee’s
concern with regard to the level of resources and personnel allocated to narcotics
trafficking, transnational organized crime, and terrorist activity in Colombia, as well
as Afghanistan, and North Korea. It states the expectation that the FY2005 budget
request will include “a reinvigorated strategy to combat narcotics trafficking and
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other transnational organized crime — with appropriate funding and personnel levels
for the Director of Central Intelligence’s Crime and Narcotics Center (CEC).”
Senate Action.  On May 8, 2003, Senator Pat Roberts introduced S. 1025, to
authorize appropriations for FY2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities, including provisions relating to Colombia. The Committee on Intelligence
reported the bill the same day (S.Rept. 108-44) while the Committee on Armed
Services reported the bill (S.Rept. 108-80) on June 26, 2003.  Section 313 of the bill
authorizes the use of funds for a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and
activities of designated terrorist organizations such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC.
This authority shall cease “if the Secretary of Defense has credible evidence that the
Colombian military is not conducting vigorous operations to restore government
authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of
paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.”  Section 313 also maintains caps of 400
each on U.S. military and contractor personnel stationed in Colombia, and prohibits
the participation of U.S. military personnel or civilian contractors in any combat
operations except for the purposes of self defense or search and rescue operations of
U.S. Armed Forces personnel, U.S. civilian employees, or civilian contractors
employed by the United States.
CRS-38
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